Whether consumers perceive for-profit, nonprofit, and government outputs to be perfect substitutes has implications for understanding the s ocial value of nonprofit and governmental producers in the marketplace. While theoretical arguments have been made in support of and against the existence of ownership effects, little empirical research has been conducted to measure their presence. This study examines data from the Wisconsin nursing home industry from 1984 through 1995 and concludes that ownership effects exist, with consumers indicating the greatest preference for nonprofit homes and the least preference for government homes, ceteris paribus. This result is robust to different specifications.
I. Introduction
A multiplicity of competing ownership types characterizes several large industries in the U. S. economy, including hospitals, education, long-term care, day care, and various social s ervices. While traditional for-profit firms sell outputs in all of these industries, a consumer living in a mixed market-in which more than one ownership type competes for business-also has the option of buying from either private nonprofit or government producers. The extent to which consumers perceive the outputs of forprofit, nonprofit, and government organizations in these mixed markets to be close substitutes is unclear, however. Simply observing that a market is mixed is insufficient to conclude that ownership type is irrelevant:
While perfect substitutability among outputs across ownership types is consistent with the long-term coexistence of multiple types, such an outcome would also prevail if different ownership types were able to establish and successfully defend separate niches in the product space. In this latter scenario, ownership effects-defined here as a systematic consumer preference (or distaste) for the outputs of particular ownership types-are present; in the former they are not. Understanding which explanation is correct would contribute to our understanding of the social value of the availability of nonprofit and government alternatives in the market. This study strives to answer the question of whether measurable ownership effects do indeed exist by examining data from the nursing home industry in Wisconsin.
For the purposes of this paper, I adopt definitions of ownership types that are standard in the literature. The for-profit firm is defined as any member of the set of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations that are subject to federal taxation, in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code; the government firm is any firm that is controlled and operated by a federal, state, or local government; and the nonprofit firm is any organization that is subject to section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The primary implications of these differences in definition are financial. In recognition of the perceived social value of nonprofit outputs, the federal government does not tax the income that nonprofits earn in the pursuit of their stated missions. Nonprofits are often exempted from local property taxes as well. At the same time, the Internal Revenue Code requires nonprofits to reinvest their profits in their operations; they are not permitted to distribute them to either outside parties (e.g., shareholders) or inside parties (e.g., managers). compensated by the gain in output variety corresponding to the presence of these ownership types in the market. Indeed, nonprofit and government firms could potentially provide a net increase to welfare by providing outputs that consumers demand and yet for-profit firms cannot profitably produce. Thus, a natural approach to studying the substitutability of outputs across ownership types is to analyze consumer demand for those various types within the framework of a differentiated products industry.
While theorists have offered rationales for the existence of ownership effects (discussed in the next section), relatively little research has actually attempted to measure their presence. This paper examines data from the Wisconsin nursing home industry, from 1984 through 1995, and asks whether prospective residents value a nursing home's ownership type when deciding which nursing home to enter. This is a natural industry to study in that mixed markets are common. 3 Thus, the typical consumer of nursing home care in the state of Wisconsin can choose between two or more different ownership types, even if the consumer's preferences over locations are fairly specific. The analysis focuses on private payer residents, who are most likely to be able to choose freely among nursing homes, as explained in the fourth section of the paper. I estimate three types of models. The first is a conditional logit model with instruments, in which the model specification is derived from the underlying utility functions of prospective nursing home residents. The second is a nested logit that permits a more flexible definition of the market. The third is a reduced form two-stage least squares model that accounts more explicitly for potential differences across ownership types in capacity and nursing home preferences over which residents to admit. The various specifications estimated here consistently yield results that indicate the presence of ownership effects. Specifically, the results suggest that consumers prefer nonprofit nursing homes to for-profit facilities and for-profits to government facilities, other things equal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The second section discusses the role of ownership effects in the context of the mixed market. The third section outlines the model and empirical strategy. The fourth section describes the industry and data. Results and discussion follow in the fifth and sixth sections, respectively.
II. Ownership effects and the mixed market
Ownership effects exist whenever consumers reveal a systematic preference for the outputs of certain ownership types over those of others. Such effects may exist for one of three different reasons: First, consumers may value ownership type in and of itself. Second, consumers may value ownership type as a signal of nonverifiable product attributes. That is, there may be product differentiation across ownership types along non-verifiable dimensions. Finally, systematic product differentiation in verifiable dimensions may exist across ownership types.
An example of valuing a given ownership type because of itself would be "buying from a nonprofit because it is a nonprofit." In such a case, the product that one buys may be no different from the product that one could buy at a for-profit-and the buyer realizes this-but the buyer may identify with the mission of the nonprofit and desire to support it by buying nonprofit outputs. That is, support for the nonprofit's mission-related activities enters into the buyer's utility function. Implied here is the buyer's belief that the organization will use the proceeds of the output sale to cross-subsidize mission-related activities. This story may be most plausible when small purchases are involved. Thus, a buyer may choose to purchase cookies from the Girl Scouts instead of purchasing similar cookies from the supermarket. It is unlikely that this explanation of ownership effects applies to the purchase of nursing home care, however. Nursing home care is a major and, for private payers, expensive decision, and the choice of nursing home will ultimately influence the prospective resident's subsequent quality of life. In such circumstances, it is highly likely that the desire to maximize the resident's physical and emotional health and comfort will dominate any desire to use the purchase of nursing home care as a form of mission support.
An ownership effect may also reflect the value of any signal associated with the corresponding ownership type. Consider the negotiation between a buyer and a seller over the price and quality of an output for which quality is nonverifiable. Under such circumstances, a consumer may be reluctant to purchase from a for-profit producer, who has an incentive to contract for the production of one level of quality but ultimately deliver an inferior quality that costs less to produce. If the output is highly nonstandardized and infrequently purchased-such as in the health care and long-term care industries-reputation effects may be insufficient to discipline for-profit firms. Nonprofit and government organizations, however, are bound by nondistribution constraints, which prohibit them from distributing their profits, thereby attenuating their profit incentives and the associated incentive to cheat their customers. For this reason, researchers have hypothesized that consumers may prefer to purchase from nonprofit or government producers when quality is nonverifiable (Hansmann 1980 , Easley and O'Hara 1983 , Weisbrod 1988 , Glaeser and Shleifer 2001 .
(These authors have generally applied their arguments to the case of nonprofit organizations, but since their arguments rest on the presence of a nondistribution constraint, one form of which also applies to governmental organizations, their arguments can also be extended to the latter type.) Thus, data that imply a consumer preference for nonprofit or governmental outputs may reflect a perception that these ownership types will provide higher nonverifiable quality. That is, ownership type could represent to the consumer a signal of nonverifiable quality. If so, then the size of ownership effects that favor nonprofit and governmental organizations will measure the value of nonverifiable quality that the consumer expects to receive at these ownership types.
A third possibility is that for-profit, nonprofit, and government firms engage in systematic product differentiation in verifiable dimensions of output across ownership types, in which case ownership effects reflect consumer preferences over this differentiation. Such differentiation may occur as a result of differences in cost structures, with a wider variety of potential profitable outputs available to lower cost ownership types. For example, if nonprofits have lower costs as a consequence of the subsidies and tax exemptions that they receive, then they may be able to provide certain types of products that for-profits could not profitably produce.
While economists have advanced theoretical arguments in support of the existence of ownership effects, there are at least two arguments against their existence. First, when comparing otherwise identical outputs, consumers may not be aware of the ownership types that produced them. If consumers do not know the ownership type at the time of purchase, they will purchase randomly across ownership types, and no significant ownership effect will be observed. Evidence from Mauser (1993) suggests that many consumers are not aware of the ownership type from which they purchase. In the nursing home industry, such reasoning is particularly compelling, since in many cases prospective residents are in poor physical and mental health and find it difficult to process information and make rational decisions (Fraundorf 1977) . Moreover, many prospective residents lack agents (such as family members) to assist them with these decisions.
A second argument against the existence of ownership effects is that consumers may not care about ownership type, even if they are aware of it. They may believe, for example, that they can measure, contract on, and verify output quality sufficiently well that they do not need to rely on the signal that ownership type might send. In other words, information asymmetries and the attendant contracting problems may be less severe than much of the literature on nonprofit organizations presumes. To the extent that consumers view ownership type as irrelevant, one would not expect the data to reveal any significant ownership effects.
Given that theory provides arguments both for and against the existence of ownership effects, the question of whether they exist calls for empirical evaluation, and yet I am aware of very little research that investigates the extent to which ownership effects actually exist. 4 The issue is nonetheless important: Whether ownership effects exist has implications for the social value of nonprofit and government ownership types.
The existence of positive ownership effects would suggest that nonprofit and government firms produce and sell outputs that are demanded by consumers but not offered by for-profits. This in turn suggests a welfareenhancing role for these organizations. The absence of ownership effects, however, may reflect the irrelevance of ownership type, which would call into question the value of the substantial subsidies and tax dollars used to support nonprofit and government enterprises, respectively, in mixed markets. A third possibility is that nonprofit and government firms improve consumer welfare in ways that consumers do not recognize and which are therefore not captured in measured ownership effects. 5 Thus, while an empirical analysis that documents the presence of ownership effects may lend support to the notion that the presence of nonprofit and government firms increase welfare, a finding of no ownership effects would be less conclusive. Even so, a finding of no ownership effects would still be informative in that it would cast doubt on theories of the signal value of ownership type.
As an additional consideration, it is possible that a measured nonprofit ownership effect is actually a religious nonprofit ownership effect. That is, since many nonprofits have religious affiliations, the finding of a positive ownership effect for nonprofits may reflect a sense of trust that emanates less from the presence of the nondistribution constraint than it does from the organization's religious values. Some of the models estimated below consider this possibility explicitly.
III. Model and empirical strategy
The data, which are discussed in detail in the next section, contain information on nursing home location, price, number of residents, ownership type, and quality for each nursing home in the state of Wisconsin. Since my data do not contain individual-specific information but can be used to form market shares, the empirical strategy relies on an aggregation assumption to deduce information about consumer preferences from firm-level market share data. Intuitively, if each individual selects the product that she prefers most, then, in the aggregate, a relatively high market share will reflect the average consumer's preference for that product, other things equal. 6 For comparative purposes, alternative models that do not rely on free consumer choice are also presented in the results section.
More specifically, private payer consumers are assumed to choose among firm outputs based on the outputs' product attributes. That is, a consumer's preference for a given output reflects that consumer's preference for the bundle of attributes that the product embodies. In the case of the nursing home industry, the consumer will likely have preferences over a home's location, price, bed availability, and a set of variables that capture the perceived quality of the nursing home. Some of these variables, including information about ownership type, are available in the data. Other relevant variables are observed by the consumer but are not included in the data. Let the indirect utility accruing to consumer i when purchasing output j in market t be expressed as a linearization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function:
, where p is the price of nursing care, W is the individual's financial assets, η is an error term, and ξ is a firmspecific measure of average utility accruing to consumers as the result of nursing home characteristics that consumers can observe but are not measured in the data (henceforth referred to as unobserved quality). X is a vector that includes indicator variables for ownership status, a set of verifiable measures of quality (nurse aides per bed lagged one year, registered nurses per bed lagged one year, number of federal violations lagged one year), and a proxy for bed availability (log of the number of staffed beds).
The relevant market for nursing home j is the number of non-insured (or privately insured) individuals-the "private payers"-requiring nursing home care who would consider purchasing from nursing home j. I consider two alternative definitions of market, distinguished by their geographic scope. In the first, the market for a nursing home in county g is all prospective private payer residents in county g. In the second, the market for a nursing home in county g is all prospective private payers in the state of Wisconsin. The first definition is both easy to analyze and sensible-particularly given that it corresponds relatively closely to the twenty-mile radius frequently used as the market boundary by industry analysts when siting nursing homes 7 -but it is also more restrictive. For either definition, consumers in the market for nursing home care are assumed to have t J +1 choices: They may purchase from any of t J nursing homes in market t, or they may choose instead to purchase an outside good (designated in the model as good 0), which is assumed here to be home health care. When all consumers select the care option that they most prefer, then the market share of nursing home j in market t is computed by integrating over the set of all values of ijt η such that ikt ijt u u > for all k not equal to j, conditioning on nursing home characteristics, prices, and consumer wealth. As good measures of prospective nursing home residents' financial assets are not available, median household income in market t-or county g of market t for the state-level market definition-is used as a crude proxy for individual wealth. 8 If the error term has the extreme-value distribution, then the difference between the log of the market share of nursing home j in market t and the log of the share of home health care in the same year is expressed as a function of the independent variables in the familiar conditional logit model:
This is the specification that I will estimate when market boundaries are defined by county boundaries.
The use of county boundaries to bound markets is in many respects reasonable for studies of nursing home choice, as prospective nursing home residents are typically assumed to have strong preferences over locations. Even so, such a definition of the market may be restrictive for at least two reasons. First, prospective residents may move from other parts of the state to a nursing home near their children. Second, prospective residents may come to a nursing home from a nearby county, a scenario that seems particularly likely in urban areas, where counties are geographically smaller and more densely populated. To accommodate the possibility that prospective residents move across county boundaries, I redefine the market to include all prospective private payer nursing home residents in the state in a given year. Following methods developed
by McFadden (1978) and Cardell (1997) , I adopt an error structure that permits a consumer's preferences for nursing homes in a given county to be correlated. For consumer i purchasing from nursing home j in county g and market t, the composite error term is expressed as
where σ is a parameter to be estimated that captures the strength of any within-county correlation. 9 The latter term, ijt ε , is interpreted as the consumer-specific deviation from the average consumer utility associated with unmeasured characteristics of nursing home j in market t. If η is distributed according to the extreme value distribution, then the model is a standard nested logit with one level of nesting. The market shares associated with such an error structure are given by
where g is the county of nursing home j, h indexes all counties,
and g j indexes all nursing homes in county g. After some manipulation (see Berry 1994) , the expression for market shares can be rewritten as
where g jt s | is the within-county market share-i.e., the market share of nursing home j in market t computed only with respect to other nursing homes in county g. 10 This is the second model that I will estimate. In addition to the structural models described by equations 1 and 4, I also estimate reduced form models (with private payers and private payer market shares as the dependent variables) for purposes of comparison.
Several points should be noted regarding the estimation of the structural models. The first is that certain dimensions of unobserved quality-that is, those captured by jt ξ -may change little over time. To the extent that this is true, fixed effects estimation is appropriate. In the fixed effects models, the error term in the regression specification represents not unobserved quality, but rather the deviation in a given year of unobserved quality from its nursing home-specific mean. The fixed effects models estimated here contain both firm and year effects.
The presence of fixed effects in the model implies that the effects of nursing home attributes that do not vary over time cannot be estimated in the same regression. For the purposes of this paper, the most important of these attributes is ownership type. 11 These effects can be recovered with a minimum distance procedure that regresses estimates of the fixed effects from the original specification on the time-invariant product attributes (Chamberlain 1982 , Nevo 2001 . Since all variables involved in this second regression are time-invariant, the procedure relies on cross-sectional variation in ownership types to identify ownership effects. 12
Both price and within-county market share are endogenous variables. One expects that both prices and within-county market shares will be higher when nursing homes provide abnormally high unobserved quality. Thus, price and within-county market share are each likely to be correlated with the error term and require instruments. The Medicaid reimbursement rate is used as an instrument for price, whereas the average number of beds of other nursing homes in the county and the number of competing nursing homes in the county are instruments for within-county market share, following the suggestion of Berry (1994) .
For purposes of estimation, nursing home market shares are computed on the basis of private payer skilled nursing care residents in the facility on December 31. It is also possible to compute market shares based on private payer admissions. In most circumstances, market shares based on this latter measure would be preferable. In the case of nursing homes, however, such a measure is likely to give misleading results, since it includes not only "true" private payers-those whose assets will be sufficient to cover nursing home bills for a year or longer-but also "false" private payers (Nyman 1989) , who are technically private payers upon admittance but will shortly thereafter be forced onto Medicaid and are therefore frequently treated by nursing homes as if they are Medicaid payers at the time of admission-i.e., they are queued. A model with persistent queuing is not amenable to the revealed preference assumptions that motivate the structural models discussed above. (I discuss this in greater detail in section five.) In the alternative reduced form models, however, I do report results of models using admissions-based market shares for purposes of comparison.
IV. Industry description and data

Nursing home care
Nursing homes provide care for individuals who need assistance with one or more activities of daily living (ADLs), which are generally defined to include eating, walking, dressing, bathing, getting into and out of a chair/bed, using the toilet, and continence. As a result, the primary determinant of the quality of nursing care is the quality of the nursing staff that assists the residents. Certain dimensions of nursing quality are straightforward to measure, such as level of training (registered nurse, etc.). Other dimensions, such as average years of experience or turnover, may be more difficult for prospective residents to assess. Still other dimensions, such as the attentiveness and responsiveness of the nursing staff, require a subjective assessment, which may be difficult to determine ex ante or-due to the idiosyncratic nature of nursing carecommunicate to other prospective residents ex post. Of the individuals who are admitted to nursing home care with their own funds, on the order of ten percent spend down their private assets and enroll in Medicaid prior to being discharged (Spence and Wiener 1990) .
During the period under consideration, relatively few private payers were covered by long-term care insurance, with less than one percent of all nursing home costs covered by private long-term care insurance as of the early 1990s (Wiener, Illston, and Hanley 1994; Binstock, Cluff, and von Mering 1996) . While the government determines Medicaid reimbursement rates prospectively in Wisconsin, the nursing home can choose the price that it charges its private payers. 13 Assuming, then, that the Medicaid reimbursement rate is above the marginal cost of production and below the willingness to pay of some private payers, the profitmaximizing nursing home will prefer to admit residents with private funds and will only admit Medicaid residents after private payer demand has been satisfied. Since Medicaid residents are unlikely to be able to choose freely among all nursing homes, only demand by private payer residents is studied in this paper.
An individual who requires nursing home care may apply to any number of nursing homes for admission. As part of the application process, the prospective applicant must complete a medical examination and be under the care of a physician. The nursing home will also request and examine data on the individual's financial status to determine the individual's ability to pay. The application process culminates in the nursing home's decision to accept or reject the application. A commonly given explanation for rejection is that the applicant's required level of care exceeds that which the facility can provide. An applicant who is accepted will be placed on a waiting list for admission if a bed is not immediately available. Nursing homes in Wisconsin are granted full discretion over how they admit their residents but are required to provide comparable care to comparable residents who have already been admitted (Huncosky 2000) . Thus, a Wisconsin nursing home may legally discriminate against the less profitable Medicaid patients in the admissions process, but it may not legally reduce the level of care provided to a Medicaid resident below the level that is provided to a comparably healthy private payer resident.
Data
The primary source of data for this study is the Wisconsin Nursing Home Directory and Fact Book. This directory is an annual publication of the Wisconsin Center for Health Statistics and covers all nursing homes in the state. For each nursing home, data are provided on ownership type, private payer prices, Medicaid reimbursement rates, the number of private payers admitted (for years after 1987), the number of private payers in residence on December 31, the number of staffed beds, bed capacity, the average daily census, the full-time equivalent number of nurses of various designations (registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse aide), the fraction of stays that are less than one year, and the address of the facility. The Wisconsin Bureau of Quality Assurance provided data on federal violations by nursing homes (specifically, the number of federal violations for which each nursing home was cited, for each year). Several of these variables capture dimensions of the quality of a nursing home. In particular, I use the following variables to measure verifiable components of nursing home quality: the number of registered nurses per bed, the number of nurse aides per bed, and the number of federal violations. In the discussion of the data that follows, I will frequently compare for-profits with all other organizations, meaning the set of nonprofit and government firms taken together; I refer to this set of organizations as "not-for-profits."
The raw data, which consisted of 4,896 observations, were reduced to the data set analyzed here according to the following steps. First, records for which variables of interest-i.e., those variables that are used in the estimation routines-had negative or missing values were deleted. Second, all records for which the private payer price of care was less than one dollar per month were eliminated. Finally, nursing homes with hospital affiliations were deleted from the sample, since demand for these nursing homes may actually reflect demand for (or elements of demand for) the attached hospital. The resulting data set contained 3,605 observations over the twelve years from 1984 to 1995, corresponding to an average of roughly 300 nursing homes per year.
In general, the data appear to be measured accurately, with the exception of private payer prices.
Many nursing homes have both single and double rooms for their residents; residents occupying a single room pay a higher price. Whenever a nursing home submits both private payer prices to the Center for Health Statistics, however, the directory reports only a single price, which is the average of the two numbers.
Descriptive statistics for the pooled sample are reported in table 1. Just over 48 percent of the sample is not-for-profit, with the distribution of not-for-profits breaking down fairly evenly across the religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and government ownership types. Occupancy rates average over 92 percent, suggesting that many nursing homes are at capacity. The within-county market share for a given nursing home is around nineteen percent, indicating that in a given year the typical nursing home will care for roughly one fifth of the private payer patients receiving nursing care in the county. Note that the average private payer rate exceeds the average Medicaid reimbursement rate by $9.60 per day, or just over $3,500 per year. Also note that somewhat more than half of all nursing homes are located in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Table 2 reports sample means for selected variables, by ownership type. On average, religious nonprofits admit the most private payers in a given year and have the most in residence in the end of the year, while for-profits have the fewest. Government facilities have the largest capacities and the smallest fraction of residents staying less than one year; they are also least likely to locate in an MSA. Private payer prices are comparable across all four ownership types. Of particular relevance to this study are the within-county market shares, which are smaller at for-profit nursing homes than at any of the other three ownership types.
Given the high occupancy rates and the difficulty of expanding capacity, 14 one might conjecture that market shares-as measured by the nursing homes' shares of residents-may simply reflect differential capacities. That is, if not-for-profit nursing homes in Wisconsin have a higher share of beds than do forprofits, a higher share of private payer residents at not-for-profits may simply reflect this higher bed share. clearly not independent. Nonetheless, the trends are not identical, suggesting that capacity can explain but a part of the allocation of nursing home residents across facilities. I revisit the issue of differential capacity constraints and patient turnover rates in the estimations.
The trends in private payer shares, by type of not-for-profit, are shown in figure 2 . In all years, private payer shares are highest at religious not-for-profits. While the private payer advantage enjoyed by religious nonprofits dips slightly over the sample period, the secular nonprofit private payer share nearly doubles; the government private payer share is roughly the same at the end of the sample period as in the beginning.
V. Results
The results of several different specifications-all with fixed firm and year effects included-are in table 3. The first two columns provide estimates of the model based on equation 1 (the "simple model"). The third and fourth columns present the corresponding estimates for the nested model (equation 4). The primary result is that all four models yield a positive and, in all models save one, significant coefficient on nonprofit status, indicating higher market shares for nonprofits (relative to for-profits), ceteris paribus. The government effect is negative for all models except the OLS simple model. 15 Turning to the other variables, note that the coefficients generally have the anticipated signs (negative for more violations and higher prices, positive for more nurses and more beds and-in the case of the nested model-higher within-county market share), even though several have relatively large standard errors. The anticipated effect of instrumenting for income-adjusted price and within-county market share is seen in a comparison of the relevant coefficients for a given specification: Instruments result in a more negative price coefficient and a less positive within-county market share coefficient. The coefficients on price seem reasonable when compared with earlier work. For example, the coefficient on price in column (iv) implies an own-price elasticity of demand of -1.25 when evaluated at the median values of within-county market share, annualized price of care, and household income, which is comparable to the elasticities previously estimated by Nyman (1989) and Scanlon (1980) . 16 The minimum distance 2 R is a measure of the amount of cross-sectional variation in the estimated fixed effects that is explained by ownership type. The values of this statistic are generally low across specifications, suggesting that much of the variation in the fixed effects is due to the presence of unobserved quality that is not picked up by the ownership effects. The minimum distance 2 χ statistic tests the hypothesis that unobserved quality is equal to zero (Nevo 2001 ). This hypothesis is easily rejected in all specifications, confirming the importance of modeling unobserved quality explicitly. I assessed the performance of the instruments using standard tests. 17 As with all subsequent nested logit regressions, the validity of the instruments was confirmed using an overidentification test due to Basmann (1960) . 18 The estimated ownership effects are nontrivial. Based on the estimates in column (ii), the typical nonprofit is predicted to have a within-county market share that is 3.3 percentage points higher than that of an otherwise comparable for-profit when the effect is evaluated at the median market share. The corresponding effect for government nursing homes is -3.5 percentage points. The nonprofit and government effects implied by the results i n column (iv) are substantially larger at 6.4 percentage points and -11.5 percentage points, respectively.
The problem of strategic location
The interpretation of these estimated ownership effects as a reflection solely of consumer preference will be i ncorrect if different ownership types tend to locate in different markets: To the extent that prospective residents have strong preferences over location and different organizational forms tend to locate in different locales, then the estimated ownership effects will be driven in part by supply-side decisions, not consumer demand. Thus, an elderly individual with a preference for nonprofit nursing homes may have an even stronger preference for remaining near her primary residence. If the only option in her neighborhood is a for-profit nursing home, she will enter a for-profit even though she prefers nonprofits. Table 4 provides information on the extent to which multiple ownership types coexist at the county level. More than one ownership type is present for roughly seventy percent of all county-years; that is, markets with only one choice of ownership type are relatively less common. Across the state and all years, for-profits dominate the "single-type" county-years. Markets are mixed at the county level if more than one ownership type operates in the county. The most common configuration is the coexistence of all three ownership types (304 county-years) while the least common configuration is the coexistence of nonprofit and government organizations with no for-profits (51).
The evidence on the relationship between nursing home location and ownership type is limited.
Ballou (2003) considers the potential impact of both demand-side and supply-side market conditions and finds that nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes do not enter significantly different markets. However, evidence from the same study clearly shows that governmental nursing homes do enter systematically different markets than private nursing homes do. Addressing the potential endogeneity of ow nership type is difficult: Lacking a strong theory of the determination of ownership type, it is difficult to justify (and easy to criticize) virtually any mooted instrument for ownership type.
A more promising approach is to limit the sample to contain only markets that are mixed at the county level. Results of a series of regressions based on this strategy are in table 5. The first column reproduces column (iii) of table 3-the instrumental variable version of the non-nested logit-for purposes of comparison. 19 The second column re-estimates this model using only markets containing at least one governmental nursing home, at least one nonprofit nursing home, and at least one for-profit nursing home.
For these counties there is no problem of strategic location since county residents can choose from any one of three ownership types. The third column omits all markets with governmental nursing homes, and the fourth retains only counties that have (1) no governmental nursing homes and (2) at least one nonprofit nursing home and at least one for-profit nursing home.
The results of table 5 are generally consistent with those of table 3. In column (ii), the governmental effect remains negative, and although the nonprofit effect disappears in that column, it reappears and increases in magnitude in columns (iii) and (iv) when only markets with no government firms (i.e., private firms only) are considered. Moreover, if one separates the nonprofit effect in column (ii) into a religious nonprofit effect and a secular nonprofit effect, the religious nonprofit effect is positive and significant (a coefficient of 0.30 with a standard error of 0.17), so only the secular nonprofit effect loses its significance.
Thus, after ensuring the presence of local options in the model, government nursing homes continue to have lower market shares than otherwise comparable for-profits, and nonprofits have higher market shares than for-profits. Insofar as the other regressors are concerned, they are less likely to be significant in the restricted samples, although they generally remain correctly signed.
The role of capacity constraints
Independently of the issue of strategic location, the presence of binding capacity constraints at a given nursing home may also bias the results reported in tables 3. In general, for-profit nursing homes that would otherwise be forced to ration private payer demand can be expected to eliminate excess demand by raising their private payer rates. Since it is not clear that nonprofit and government nursing homes maximize profits, however, these two ownership types may not raise private payer rates to clear excess private payer demand. To the extent that nonprofit and government nursing homes ration private payers while for-profits do not, the ownership effects estimated above understate the true consumer preference for nonprofits and overstate the consumer's dislike of government facilities. That is, the true nonprofit ownership effect is larger than the estimated effect if capacity constraints are forcing private payers away from nonprofits and toward the less preferred for-profit facilities.
The structural models are based on "nearly free" choice at a given point in time among all existing products. If consumers cannot choose freely, then the aggregation assumption of the model is not valid, and the model estimates cannot be interpreted as parameters of individual utility functions. When private payer waiting times are short relative to the period for which the data are collected (one year, in the case of the Wisconsin nursing home data), the models presented here-which include a proxy for waiting times-will do a reasonably good job of accommodating them. When actual private payer waiting times are long relative to a year, however, these models are less satisfactory.
It is not possible to determine from the nursing home data whether private payers generally face extended waiting times for admission, i.e., whether capacity constraints at nonprofit and government nursing homes are truly binding with respect to private payers. Prospective Medicaid residents effectively receive nursing home care at a price of zero, implying that the total demand for nursing home care is large relative to the number of licensed nursing home beds. Therefore, one expects that all nursing homes will operate at or near capacity-assuming that the Medicaid reimbursement rate exceeds the marginal cost of a facility's last available bed-since under such circumstances nursing homes will always find it profitable to fill all of their beds. This does not necessarily imply that a private payer will have to wait for an extended period for an available bed, however, since nursing homes that prefer to admit private payers can always move them to the top of the waiting list. Moreover, since it is costless to put one's name on a waiting list, predicted waiting times that are based only on resident turnover and the length of waiting lists will consistently overstate actual waiting times.
If actual waiting times (for private payers) at nonprofit and government nursing homes are sufficiently long, then a model that considers the influence of supply constraints explicitly and does not rely on an assumption of unconstrained utility maximization will be preferable. One might expect that market shares will be a function of demand-side variables relating to quality of care and supply-side variables that influence the availability of beds, such as bed turnover (measured here by the fraction of residents with lengths of stay under one year) and bed capacity. The results of such regressions are presented in table 6. The dependent variable in the first column is the log of the number of private payers in residence at the end of the year, while the dependent variable in the second column is the log of the number of private payer admissions.
The dependent variables in the third and fourth columns are the logs of the within-county market shares of end-of-year private payers and private payer admissions, respectively. The independent variables include, in addition to the regressors employed above, a dummy variable indicating whether the nursing home is located in a metropolitan statistical area and interactions between the supply-side variables and ownership indicator variables. As previously, price is assumed to be endogenous. Relative to the preceding structural model of utility maximization, this reduced form model has the advantage of incorporating supply-side variables that plausibly influence private payer market shares instead of implicitly assuming free consumer choice. This advantage is not without cost, however, as the present model is unable to incorporate consumer preferences over specific locations or measure meaningful substitution effects across nursing homes.
The results of the regressions are consistent with those of the earlier model, with ownership effects positive at nonprofits and negative at the government facilities. The models that utilize the log of withincounty market share as the dependent variables are in several respects less satisfactory than the models that use the log of private payers. (Note, for example, the small magnitude and statistical insignificance of the price elasticity in columns three and four.) The latter two models do, however, allow for a more direct comparison of ownership effects with those estimated in the earlier utility maximization model. Based on the results presented in column three, the nonprofit and government ownership effects are 3.0 and -5.1
percentage points, respectively. 20 Thus, a nonprofit is predicted to have a within-county market share that is three percentage points higher than that of a comparable for-profit after controlling explicitly for supply-side measures of bed availability. The ownership effects are all significantly different from zero. Thus, estimated ownership effects cannot be attributed exclusively to differences in bed turnover and bed capacity.
Does religious affiliation drive the nonprofit effect?
It is conceivable that a nursing home's religious affiliation is important to a prospective resident, either because the resident prefers to live with others who share her values or beliefs, or-when monitoring problems are present-because the resident is more willing to trust organizations with religious affiliations over those without religious affiliations. If this is the case, then a "religious effect" may actually be driving the nonprofit effect documented above.
To check this, I re-estimated the models with nonprofit status disaggregated into "religious nonprofit" and "secular nonprofit." Table 7 reports the resulting ownership effects for a subset of these models. The first three columns provide results from the structural model with instruments and fixed effects; the last two columns provide results from the reduced form model (using end-of-year data), also with instruments and fixed effects. Note that in all cases, positive-and nearly always significant-effects are measured for both religious and secular nonprofits, with the religious effect being larger. For example, the results of the conditional ( non-nested) logit in the first column indicate religious and secular nonprofit ownership effects of 4.0 and 2.9 percentage points, respectively. In the one specification in which the secular nonprofit effect is insignificant, it remains comparable in magnitude to the significant effects from other models. The estimated government effects are comparable to those presented earlier.
The Wald statistic toward the bottom of the table tests the equivalence of the religious nonprofit and secular nonprofit effects and is distributed according to the chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom. In spite of the consistently larger religious effects, in no specification is the hypothesis that the religious and secular effects are the same rejected. The evidence from the table strongly indicates that the more general nonprofit effect is not being driven by a consumer preference for religious organizations.
Sensitivity analyses
Variations on the specifications presented above were also estimated. Among the variations estimated were models that omitted fixed effects, models that used contemporaneous rather than lagged regressors, and models that used different measures of staffing. The estimated ownership effects for all models estimated were generally similar in both magnitudes and statistical significance to those reported in the tables: Nonprofit effects were positive, and government effects were either negative or zero. 21 I ran an additional set of regressions to check on the possibility that new entrants in a given market and year could bias results in a capacity-constrained environment. New nursing homes have greater capacity to admit private payers and therefore may have abnormally high market shares of private payers in their first year for supply-side reasons. The use of end-of-year market shares instead of admissions market shares helps to inoculate against this problem, but as an additional control I (1) re-estimated the non-nested structural model after omitting any markets with a new nursing home and (2) re-estimated the reduced form models after adding a dummy variable indicating whether the nursing home was in its first year of operation. In both models, the results for nonprofits were little changed from the results reported in the tables. The estimated government effects continued to be either negative or zero.
VI. Discussion
The results are highly consistent across specifications and reveal that both types of nonprofit have larger market shares than do for-profits, while government nursing homes have the lowest market shares, ceteris paribus. These results are consistent with the interpretation that the market share differentials reflect a consumer preference for nonprofits over for-profits, and for for-profits over government homes, although two specifications did indicate a positive effect for government ownership.
The primary implication of the findings reported here is that ownership type appears to matter to consumers. The results cast doubt on the arguments that ownership type is irrelevant or unknown to individuals making purchases in mixed markets. If consumers did not know or care about the ownership type of producers, then one would expect them to purchase randomly across different ownership types, other things equal, which is contrary to t he conclusion implied by the above analysis. While it does appear that consumers value nonprofit status, however, the reasons for this preference are not entirely clear: The positive nonprofit effect in the nursing home industry may be the result either of the signal value of nonprofit status or of systematic product differentiation between nonprofits and other ownership types. Both explanations suggest that nonprofits can enhance social welfare-either through facilitating trade and lowering transactions costs (the signaling explanation) or increasing variety (the product differentiation explanation)-in ways that for-profits cannot. That is, if for-profits were credible sellers that could differentiate their products in the same ways that nonprofits do, then one would not expect to observe a distribution of market shares that consistently favors nonprofits. 22 Traditional theories of the signal value of ownership types-which suggest that consumers prefer those organizations that are bound by a nondistribution constraint to those that are not whenever quality is nonverifiable-are inadequate to explain the result that government nursing homes have lower market shares than for-profits, other things equal. A product differentiation story may be more plausible. To the extent that nursing homes reject applications for admission when prospective residents have insufficient private funds, government nursing homes may act as a safety net for Medicaid patients, admitting all those who could not gain admission elsewhere. Such an access-oriented mission may be pursued at the expense of certain costly dimensions of output quality that the consumer observes (and values) but are not recorded in the data. Under such circumstances, private payers may elect to avoid government nursing homes in favor of other ownership types.
The evidence presented here does not support the contention that consumer preferences for religious nonprofits drive the more general nonprofit effect; this finding is consistent across specifications.
One might expect, a priori, that religious nonprofits would fully account for any general nonprofit effect for two reasons. First, if prospective residents use the name of the nursing home to infer ownership type, it is generally easier to identify religious nonprofit status (e.g., St. Mary's) than secular nonprofit status (e.g.,
Whispering Pines), which may be indistinguishable by this name recognition method from for-profit status (e.g., Whispering Oaks). Second, if prospective residents are concerned about being exploited, they may place their trust in an organization that they believe shares their religious values, and not in the nondistribution constraint. Both lines of reasoning suggest positive ownership effects for religious nonprofits only. In fact, estimated effects for secular nonprofits were consistently positive and statistically equivalent to the estimated effects for religious nonprofits. Thus, to the extent that buyers use ownership type as a proxy for nonverifiable quality, buyers appear to trust (and recognize) both secular and religious nonprofits.
Conclusions
The analysis presented here shows that-after controlling for differences in bed capacity, bed turnover, price, location, and quality-market shares for nursing homes in the state of Wisconsin are highest for nonprofits and lowest for government nursing homes, with for-profits occupying an intermediate position.
The results imply that ownership type does appear to matter to consumers, and theories of ownership type based on the presence of nonverifiable quality find some support in the consistently positive nonprofit effects estimated here. Whether the estimated nonprofit effect is the result of signals of nonverifiable quality or of verifiable product differentiation, the results suggest in either case a consumer preference for the type of outputs that nonprofits produce, which in turn suggests that nonprofits serve a valuable purpose by providing outputs that are not available in the for-profit sector. The case of government nursing homes is more complex. Government nursing homes cannot distribute their profits, but if there is any positive signal value associated with this fact, it is more than offset by other considerations that, for nearly all of the models estimated here, result in either negative or insignificant ownership effects. While these effects generally suggest that private payer consumers prefer private nursing homes to government facilities, the latter may still play a social role as a safety net for those lacking private funds who may find it difficult to be admitted elsewhere. In other words, while the results do not find support for the argument that government nursing homes enhance welfare by providing a product that is demanded by private payers and yet not supplied by the private sector, government facilities may increase welfare in other ways not studied
here. It would be of interest to learn the extent to which government nursing homes do indeed admit sicker or poorer residents that had previously been turned away at private facilities.
Of additional interest is the extent to which the nonprofit effect has changed in recent years with the formation of watchdog organizations that monitor and "grade" nursing homes. If the nonprofit effect reflects a signal of nonverifiable quality, then the collection and dissemination of information that is otherwise costly to obtain should correspond to a decline in the nonprofit effect, as individual nursing home reputations become tied more closely to the monitors' reports and less to ownership type. While the nonprofit effect in the nursing home industry would be weakened in such circumstances, it would still be possible for nonprofit status to play a socially valuable role as the guarantor of the integrity of the monitoring organizations. By contrast, if the nonprofit effect is due solely to systematic differentiation in verifiable product attributes, then an increase in information disseminated by monitors would not influence the nonprofit effect.
1 A nonprofit may, in fact, realize taxable income if that income is generated by an activity that is unrelated (in the view of the IRS) to its mission.
2 In a study of the hospital industry, Sloan (1988) finds that the weighted-average cost of capital is actually slightly lower for nonprofits than it is for for-profits. I am not aware of any comparable studies of the nursing home industry, which is the industry considered in this paper.
3 It is not unusual for more than one ownership type to compete within the same county. Of the 824 county-years in the data set analyzed in this paper, 69.9 percent are characterized by the presence of two or more ownership types.
4 Mauser (1993) , studies a related question in her analysis of nonprofit and for-profit day care facilities, but she does not measure ownership effects, as defined and discussed here, explicitly. Instead, her analysis seeks to identify the characteristics of consumers who choose nonprofit day care and asks how these differ from the characteristics of consumers who choose for-profit day care.
5 There is a substantial supply-side literature on whether outputs differ across ownership types and the extent to which the differences measured in various dimensions of output are meaningful. See Weisbrod (1998) for a nice summary of this literature.
6 While the aggregation assumption itself-which assumes a particular distribution of disturbances in the econometric model-is standard, the framework used here is susceptible to criticism on other grounds. First, it assumes that individuals can choose freely among all available outputs, which may not be true in the nursing home industry. Second, it assumes that all consumers have the same preferences over ownership types. The first objection is addressed in the next section. The second can be dealt with in the context of a discrete choice random coefficients model, for which Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) have developed estimation methods. Ballou (2000) fails to reject the hypothesis of identical coefficients on ownership effects for all individuals.
7 I am indebted to a referee for making this point. , also has an extreme-value distribution.
Specifically, suppose that v is distributed according to
, where the ) (⋅ C class of distributions is defined in Cardell (1997) . (Recall that α is the coefficient on the poorly measured variable.) Then an application of theorem 2.1 from Cardell (1997) shows that η α α + ) ( v is distributed according to the extreme-value distribution. Furthermore, the composite error term is, by construction, independent of the value of α . The assumptions placed on the distribution of v are restrictive; price and income effects should be interpreted cautiously. 9 Theory restricts σ to the interval [0,1]. Values of σ approaching one indicate that unmeasured individual-specific preferences are driven almost solely by location, whereas values approaching zero imply that the within-group correlation of preferences is relatively weak.
10 See Cardell (1997, theorem 3.1) . For a more complete discussion of this class of models, see McFadden (1978) .
11 While ownership type can theoretically vary over time through facility conversions, such conversions are rare; moreover, I treat a nursing home that changes ownership as two separate firms, one for the first owner, and one for the second. 12 The implementation of this two-step procedure is straightforward, although the computation of the covariance matrix for the combined first-stage and second-stage estimates requires some routine calculation. Computational details are available from the author upon request. 13 Private payer rates were regulated in several states during this period; Wisconsin, however, was not one of them.
14 During the time period studied here, nursing homes in Wisconsin were subject to certificate-of-need laws, according to which nursing homes were only allowed to expand if they were successful in convincing the state government that expansion was clinically necessary. 15 A comparison of other coefficients across models suggests that the models with instruments are more reliable than those using ordinary least squares, suggesting that the positive government effect in column (i) be discounted. 16 The elasticities were computed for within-county market shares rather than for overall market shares to facilitate comparisons with earlier results, which assume that the county is the relevant market and do not consider the influence of an outside good. Marginal effects are derived from the formula for within-county market share under the assumptions on the error structure discussed previously: Robust standard errors are in small print. All specifications are estimated with firm and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of firm market share to outside good market share. Market shares are constructed based on the number of SNF private payer residents on December 31. * Significant at the 10 percent level or better. Total county-years 824 Robust standard errors are in small print. All specifications are estimated with firm and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of firm market share to outside good market share. Market shares are constructed based on the number of SNF private payer residents on December 31. * Significant at the 10 percent level or better. Robust standard errors are in small print; numbers under ownership effects are Wald statistics. All models contain fixed and year effects. * Significant at the 10 percent level or better.
Log of Private Payers
Log of Within-County Market Share Robust standard errors are in small print for the latent utility models; for the reduced form models, numbers in small print are Wald statistics. All specifications are IV and estimated with firm and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of firm market share to outside good market share in columns (i)-(iii), the log of private payers in column (iv), and the log of within-county market share in column (v). Market shares are constructed based on the number of SNF private payer residents on December 31. * Significant at the 10 percent level or better. 7 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Year Not-for-profit payer share Not-for-profit bed share 
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